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Common Value Auctions 
and the 
Winner’s Curse
Lessons from the Economics Laboratory
John H. Kagel
Ohio State University
Auctions are of considerable practical and theoretical importance.
In practical terms, the value of goods exchanged in auctions each year
is huge. Governments routinely use auctions to purchase goods and
services, to sell government assets, and to fund the national debt. Pri-
vate sector auctions are common as well, and are of growing impor-
tance in areas such as deregulated utility markets, allocation of
pollution rights, and the large variety of items now being sold via Inter-
net auctions. Auctions are commonly employed when one party to the
exchange (for example, the seller) is uncertain about the value that
buyers place on the item; they provide a mechanism, absent middle-
men, to establish value in such situations. Auctions play a prominent
role in the theory of exchange, as they remain one of the simplest and
most familiar means of price determination in the absence of interme-
diate market makers. In addition, auctions serve as valuable illustra-
tions, and one of the most prominent applications, of games of
incomplete information, as bidders’ private information is the main
factor affecting strategic behavior (Wilson 1992).
There are at least two distinct types of risk in auctions. In private
value auctions, where bidders know the value of the item to themselves
with certainty, there is uncertainty regarding other bidders’ values. In
first-price sealed-bid auctions, in which buyers simultaneously submit
sealed bids with the high bid winning the item at the price bid, bidders
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face a strategic trade-off: the lower their bid the higher their surplus
conditional on winning, but the lower their probability of winning.1
Further, the famous (within economic circles, at least) Vickrey auction
(Vickrey 1961), in which the high bid wins but pays the second-highest
bid price, was designed with the specific purpose of eliminating this
strategic uncertainty. Bidders in the Vickrey auction have a dominant
strategy of bidding their valuations, so they do not have to consider this
strategic trade-off. (Similarly, in an open outcry English auction in
which bidding starts out low and the auctioneer gradually raises the
price, bidders have a dominant strategy to remain active until the price
reaches their valuation. Hence, there are no strategic trade-offs here as
well.)
Common value auctions, the other canonical type of auction, intro-
duce a whole new risk dimension. In a pure common value auction, the
value of the item is the same to all bidders. What makes the auction
interesting is that bidders do not know the value at the time they bid.
Instead they receive signal values that are correlated—or, more techni-
cally, affiliated (Milgrom and Weber 1982)—with the value of the
item, so that bidders must estimate the common value based on their
private information signals, while still wrestling with the strategic
issues associated with private value auctions. Mineral rights auctions,
particularly the federal government’s outer continental shelf (OCS) oil
lease auctions, are typically modeled as pure common value auctions.
There is a common value element to most auctions. For example, bid-
ders for an oil painting may purchase for their own pleasure, constitut-
ing a private value element, but they may also bid for investment and
eventual resale, reflecting the common value element. 
There are no efficiency issues in pure common value auctions, as
all bidders place equal value on the item.2 What has been of overriding
concern to both theorists and practitioners for these auctions are the
revenue-raising effects of different auction institutions. A second key
issue, one that has provided much of the focus for both experimental
and empirical work on common value auctions, is the winner’s curse,
an unpredicted effect that was initially postulated on the basis of field
data, and whose existence has often been hotly debated among econo-
mists.
The winner’s curse story begins with Capen, Clapp, and Campbell
(1971), three petroleum engineers who claimed that oil companies had
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suffered unexpectedly low rates of return in the 1960s and 1970s on
OCS lease sales “year after year.”3 They argued that these low rates of
return resulted from the fact that winning bidders ignored the informa-
tional consequences of winning. That is, bidders naively based their
bids on the unconditional expected value of the item (their own esti-
mates of value), which, although correct on average, ignores the fact
that you only win when your estimate happens to be the highest (or one
of the highest) of those competing for the item. But winning against a
number of rivals following similar bidding strategies implies that your
estimate is an overestimate of the value of the lease conditional on the
event of winning. Unless this adverse selection effect is accounted for
in formulating a bidding strategy, it will result in winning bids that pro-
duce below normal or even negative profits. The systematic failure to
account for this adverse selection effect is commonly referred to as the
winner’s curse: you win, you lose money, and you curse. 
Terminological aside: When discussing the winner’s curse, many
economists, particularly theorists, unfortunately use the term to refer to
the difference between the expected value of the item conditional on
the event of winning and the naive expectation (not conditioning on the
event of winning). Further, their use of the term typically refers to play-
ers who fully account for this winner’s curse, rather than those who fall
prey to it.
The idea that oil companies suffered from a winner’s curse in OCS
lease sales was greeted with skepticism by many economists, as it
implies that bidders repeatedly err, violating basic economic notions of
rationality and contrary to equilibrium predictions.4 An alternative and
simpler explanation as to why oil companies might claim that they fell
prey to a winner’s curse lies in cartel theory, as responsiveness to the
winner’s curse claim could serve as a coordination device to get rivals
to reduce their bids in future sales. Nevertheless, claims that bidders
fell prey to the winner’s curse have arisen in a number of field settings.
In addition to the oil industry (Capen, Clapp, and Campbell 1971;
Lorenz and Dougherty 1983 and references cited therein), claims have
been made in auctions for book publication rights (Dessauer 1981),
professional baseball’s free agency market (Cassing and Douglas 1980;
Blecherman and Camerer 1998), corporate takeover battles (Roll
1986), and in real estate auctions (Ashenfelter and Genesore 1992). 
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It is exceedingly difficult to support claims of a winner’s curse
using field data because of reliability problems with the data and
because alternative explanations for overbidding are often available.
For example, Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987) found that in
early OCS lease sales, average profits were negative in auctions with
seven or more bidders. They note that one possible explanation for this
outcome is the increased severity of the adverse selection problem
associated with more bidders. However, they note that the data could
also be explained by bidder uncertainty regarding the number of firms
competing on a given tract (their preferred explanation). That is, since
most tracts received less than six bids, it seems likely that firms would
expect this number or less. As a result, although firms might have fully
accounted for the adverse selection effect based on the expected num-
ber of firms bidding on a tract, they would nevertheless be incorrect for
tracts that attracted above average numbers of bidders, and overbid on
those tracts.
The ambiguity inherent in using field data, in conjunction with the
controversial nature of claims regarding a winner’s curse, provided the
motivation for experimental studies of the winner’s curse. Early labo-
ratory experiments showed that inexperienced bidders are quite sus-
ceptible to the winner’s curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983; Kagel
and Levin 1986; Kagel et al. 1989). In fact, the winner’s curse has been
such a pervasive phenomenon in the laboratory that most of these ini-
tial experiments have focused on its robustness and the features of the
environment that might attenuate its effects. Additional interest has
focused on public policy issues—the effects of public information
regarding the value of the auctioned item and the effects of different
auction institutions on sellers’ revenue. 
This survey begins with a brief analysis of the first experimental
demonstration of the winner’s curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983).
This is followed by summaries of experiments investigating bidding in
common value auctions using an experimental design that I helped
develop. These experiments also demonstrate the existence of a win-
ner’s curse even when allowing for extensive feedback and learning
from past auction outcomes. They also address policy issues such as
the effects of public information and different auction institutions (e.g.,
first-price sealed-bid auctions versus open outcry English auctions) on
sellers’ revenue. I conclude with a brief summary of the empirical find-
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ings from the experimental literature and the role experiments have
played in the successful sale of government airwave rights (the spec-
trum auctions). In reviewing the experimental work on common value
auctions, I hope to show how experiments proceed by successively nar-
rowing down plausible explanations for the question at hand. This is
done through a series of experiments rather than any single “critical”
experiment; it is based on sorting out between competing explanations,
and on following up on the logical implications of behavior observed
in earlier experiments.
AN INITIAL EXPERIMENT DEMONSTRATING THE 
WINNER’S CURSE
Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) conducted the first experiment
demonstrating a winner’s curse. Using M.B.A. students at Boston Uni-
versity, the experiment was conducted in class, with students partici-
pating in four first-price sealed-bid auctions. Bidders formed their own
estimates of the value of each of four commodities—jars containing
800 pennies, 160 nickels, 200 large paper clips each worth four cents,
and 400 small paper clips each worth $0.02. Unknown to subjects, each
jar had a value of $8.00. (Subjects bid on the value of the commodity,
not the commodity itself.) In addition to their bids, subjects provided
their best estimate of the value of the commodities and a 90 percent
confidence bound around these estimates. A prize of $2.00 was given
for the closest estimate to the true value in each auction. The number of
bidders varied between 4 and 26. Their analysis focused on bidder
uncertainty about the value of the commodity and the size of the bid-
ding population.
The average value estimate across all four commodities was $5.13
($2.87 below the true value). As the authors note, this underestimation
should reduce the likelihood and magnitude of the winner’s curse. In
contrast to the mean estimate, the average winning bid was $10.01,
resulting in an average loss to the winner of $2.01.5 The average win-
ning bid generated losses in over half of all the auctions. 
Estimated bid functions, using individual bids as the unit of obser-
vation, showed that bids were positively, and significantly, related to
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individual estimates so that bidders indeed faced an adverse selection
problem, only winning when they had higher estimates of the value of
the item. Bids were inversely related to the uncertainty associated with
individual estimates, but this effect was small (other things equal, a
$1.00 increase in the 90 percent confidence interval reduced bids by
$0.03). Numbers of bidders had no significant effect on individual
bids.
In contrast, regressions employing the average winning bid
showed that these bids were positively, and significantly, related to the
winning bidder’s estimate of uncertainty and to the number of bidders
in the auction. This suggests that winning bidders are substantially
more aggressive than other bidders. Indeed, Bazerman and Samuelson
note that average winning bids were sensitive to a handful of grossly
inflated bids.
The results of this experiment show that the winner’s curse is easy
to observe. However, many economists would object to the fact that
subjects had no prior experience with the problem and no feedback
regarding the outcomes of their decisions between auctions, so that the
results could be attributed to the mistakes of totally inexperienced bid-
ders. The robustness of these results is even more suspect given their
sensitivity to a handful of grossly inflated bids, which one might sup-
pose would be eliminated as a result of bankruptcies or learning in
response to losses incurred in earlier auctions. Common value auction
experiments conducted by Kagel and Levin (1986) and their associates
explore these issues, along with a number of public policy implications
of the theory.
SEALED-BID AUCTIONS
Kagel and Levin and their associates conducted experiments in
which bidders participated in a series of auctions with feedback regard-
ing outcomes. Bidders were given starting cash balances from which
losses were subtracted and profits were added. Bidders whose cash bal-
ances became negative were declared bankrupt and were no longer per-
mitted to bid. Unlike the Bazerman and Samuelson experiment, Kagel
and Levin controlled the uncertainty associated with the value of the
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auctioned item rather than simply measuring it. They did this by con-
ducting auctions in which the common value, xo, was chosen randomly
each period from a known uniform distribution with upper and lower
bounds . In auctions with a symmetric information structure, each
bidder is provided with a private information signal, x, drawn from a
uniform distribution on [xo – ε, xo + ε], where ε is known. In first-price
sealed-bid auctions, bids are ranked from highest to lowest with the
high bidder paying the amount bid and earning profits equal to xo – b1,
where b1 is the highest bid. Losing bidders neither gain nor lose money.
In this design, the strategy of bidding, max [x – ε, x], is a risk-free
strategy that fully protects a bidder from negative earnings since it is
the lower bound estimate of xo. This lower bound estimate for xo was
computed for subjects along with an upper bound estimate of xo, (min
). Bidders were provided with illustrative distributions of sig-
nal values relative to xo, and several dry runs were conducted before
playing for cash. Following each auction period, bidders were provided
with the complete set of bids, listed from highest to lowest, along with
the corresponding signal values, the value of xo, and the earnings of the
high bidder.
Surviving bidders were paid their end-of-experiment balances in
cash. To hold the number of bidders fixed while controlling for bank-
ruptcies, m > n subjects were often recruited, with only n bidding at
any given time (who bids in each period was determined randomly or
by a fixed rotation rule). As bankruptcies occur, m shrinks but (hope-
fully) remains greater than or equal to the target value n.
Some Initial Experimental Results: Inexperienced Bidders
Auctions with inexperienced bidders show a pervasive winner’s
curse that results in numerous bankruptcies. Table 4.1 provides illus-
trative data on this point. For the first nine auctions, profits averaged
–$2.57, compared to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) pre-
diction of $1.90, with only 17 percent of all auctions having positive
profits. Note: this is after bidders had participated in two or three dry
runs, with feedback of signal values, xo, and bids following each auc-
tion, so that the results cannot be attributed to a total lack of experi-
ence. The negative profits are not a simple matter of bad luck either,
or a handful of grossly inflated bids, as 59 percent of all bids and 82
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NOTE: Sm = standard error or mean. **significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test; ***significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
a For all auctions.
SOURCE: From Kagel et al. (1989). Reprinted with permission from Western Economic Association International.
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percent of the high bids were above E[xo|X = x1n]; the expected value
of xo conditional on having the highest signal x. Further, 40 percent of
all subjects starting these auctions went bankrupt. In short, the win-
ner’s curse is a genuinely pervasive problem for inexperienced bid-
ders. It is remarkably robust being reported under a variety of
treatment conditions (Kagel et al. 1989; Lind and Plott 1991; Goeree
and Offerman 2000) and for different subject populations, including
professional bidders from the commercial construction industry
(Dyer, Kagel, and Levin 1989).
Auctions with Moderately Experienced Bidders and the Effects of 
Public Information on Sellers’ Revenue
Kagel and Levin (1986) report auctions for moderately experi-
enced bidders (those who had participated in at least one prior first-
price common value auction experiment). Treatment variables of inter-
est were the number of rival bidders and the effects of public informa-
tion about xo on revenue. Table 4.2 reports some of their results. For
small groups (auctions with 3–4 bidders), the general pattern was one
of positive profits averaging $4.32 per auction, which is significantly
greater than zero but still well below the RNNE prediction of $7.48 per
auction. In contrast, for these same bidders bidding in larger groups
(auctions with 6–7 bidders), profits averaged –$0.54 per auction com-
pared to the RNNE prediction of $4.82. Thus, the profit picture had
improved substantially compared to the inexperienced bidders dis-
cussed in the previous section.
However, comparing large and small group auctions, actual profit
decreased substantially more than profit opportunities as measured by
the RNNE criteria. This implies that subjects were bidding more
aggressively, rather than less aggressively, as the number of rivals
increased, contrary to the RNNE prediction. This is confirmed in
regressions using individual subject bids as the dependent variable.
Higher individual bids in response to increased numbers of rivals is
often considered to be the hallmark characteristic of a winner’s curse.
Thus, although bidders had adjusted reasonably well to the adverse
selection problem in auctions with 3–4 bidders, in auctions with 6–7
bidders, with its heightened adverse selection effect, the winner’s curse
reemerged as subjects confounded the heightened adverse selection
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effect by bidding more aggressively with more bidders. This result also
suggests that the underlying learning processes are context-specific
rather than involving some sort of “theory absorption” that readily gen-
eralizes to new environments.6
Public information was provided to bidders in the form of
announcing the lowest signal value, xL. For the RNNE, public informa-
tion about the value of the item raises expected revenue. The mecha-
nism underlying this outcome works as follows: All bidders evaluate
the additional public information assuming that their signal is the high-
est since, in equilibrium, they only win in this case. Evaluating addi-
tional information from this perspective, together with affiliation,
induces all bidders other than the highest signal holder to, on average,
revise their bids upward after an announcement of unbiased public
information. This upward revision results from two factors: 
1) Bidders without the highest signal treat the public information as
“good news.” These bidders formulated their bids on the assump-
tion that they held the highest private information signal and
would win the auction. As such, with affiliation, the public infor-
mation tells them that, on average, the expected value of the item
is higher than they had anticipated (i.e., the private information
signal they are holding is somewhat lower than expected, condi-
tional on winning, for this particular auction), which leads them
to increase their bids.
2) Bidders respond to this anticipated increase in bids from lower
signal holders by raising their bids. The bidder with the highest
signal is not, on average, subject to this first force. Thus, she
does not, on average, revise her estimate of the true value. Never-
theless, she raises her bid in anticipation of other bidders raising
their bids; the “domino” effect of bidders with lower signals rais-
ing their bids.
These strategic considerations hold for a wide variety of public
information signals (Milgrom and Weber 1982). There are, however,
several methodological advantages to using xL. First, the RNNE bid
function can be readily solved for xL, provided low signal holders are
restricted to bidding xL, so that the experimenter continues to have a
benchmark model of fully rational behavior against which to compare
76Table 4.2 Profits and Bidding by Experiment and Number of Active Bidders: Private Information Conditions 
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actual bidding. Second, xL provides a substantial dose of public infor-
mation about xo (it cuts expected profit in half), while still maintaining
an interesting auction. As such it should have a substantial impact on
prices, regardless of any inherent noise in behavior. Finally, the experi-
menter can always implement finer, more subtle probes of public infor-
mation after seeing what happens with such a strong treatment effect.7
Kagel and Levin (1986) found that in auctions with small numbers
of bidders (3–4), public information resulted in statistically significant
increases in revenue that averaged 38 percent of the RNNE model’s
prediction. However, in auctions with larger numbers of bidders (6–7),
public information reduced average sellers’ revenue by $1.79 per auc-
tion, compared to the RNNE model’s prediction of an increase of
$1.78. Kagel and Levin attribute this reduction in revenue to the pres-
ence of a relatively strong winner’s curse in auctions with large num-
bers of bidders. If bidders suffer from a winner’s curse, the high bidder
consistently overestimates the item’s value, so that announcing xL is
likely to result in a downward revision of the most optimistic bidders’
estimate. Thus, out of equilibrium, public information introduces a
potentially powerful offset to the forces promoting increased bids dis-
cussed earlier, and will result in reduced revenue if the winner’s curse
is strong enough. This hypothesis is confirmed using detailed data from
auctions with 6–7 bidders, which shows that the RNNE model’s pre-
diction of an increase in sellers’ revenue is critically dependent on
whether or not there was a winner’s curse in the corresponding private
information market.
Is the Winner’s Curse a Laboratory Artifact? Limited Liability 
for Losses
Results of experiments are often subject to alternative explana-
tions. These alternative explanations typically provide the motivation
for subsequent experiments that further refine our understanding of
behavior. This section deals with one such alternative explanation and
the responses to it.
In the Kagel and Levin (1986) design, subjects enjoyed limited lia-
bility as they could not lose more than their starting cash balances.
Hansen and Lott (1991) argued that the overly aggressive bidding
reported in Kagel and Levin may have been a rational response to this
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limited liability rather than a result of the winner’s curse. In a one-shot
auction, if a bidder’s cash balance is zero, so that they are not liable for
any losses, it indeed pays to overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium
bidding strategy. With downside losses eliminated, the only constraint
on more aggressive bidding is the opportunity cost of bidding more
than is necessary to win the item. In exchange, higher bids increase the
probability of winning the item and making positive profits. The net
effect, in the case of zero or small cash balances, is an incentive to bid
more than the Nash equilibrium prediction. Hansen and Lott’s argu-
ment provides a possible alternative explanation to the overly aggres-
sive bidding reported in Kagel and Levin (1986) and in Kagel et al.
(1989).
Responses to the limited-liability argument have been twofold.
First, Kagel and Levin (1991) reevaluated their data in light of Hansen
and Lott’s arguments, demonstrating that for almost all bidders cash
balances were always large enough so that it never paid to deviate from
the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in a one-shot auction. Second,
subsequent empirical work has demonstrated a winner’s curse in exper-
imental designs where limited liability for losses could not logically
account for overbidding. This provides experimental verification that
limited-liability forces do not account for the overly aggressive bidding
reported.
Kagel and Levin’s design protects against limited-liability prob-
lems since bidding x – ε insures against all losses and bidders have
their own personal estimate of the maximum possible value of the item
(min [x + ε, ]). The latter implies that it is never rational, limited lia-
bility or not, to bid above this maximum possible value in a first-price
auction. Further, cash balances only have to be a fraction of the maxi-
mum possible loss for the limited-liability argument to lose its force in
a first-price auction. For example, Kagel and Levin (1991) report simu-
lations for auctions with 4 or 7 bidders, with ε = $30 and cash balances
of $4.50 (which 48 out of the 50 bidders always had), for which unilat-
eral deviations from the RNNE bid function were not profitable even
when fully accounting for bidders’ limited liability. Further, limited-
liability arguments imply more aggressive bidding in auctions with
fewer rather than larger numbers of bidders, just the opposite of what
the data show.8 As such, overbidding in the Kagel and Levin experi-
x
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ment must be explained on some other grounds, such as the judgmental
error underlying the winner’s curse.
Empirical work on this issue has proceeded on several fronts. Lind
and Plott (1991) replicated Kagel and Levin’s results in auctions where
bankruptcy problems were almost completely eliminated. One experi-
mental treatment involved conducting private value auctions where
subjects were sure to make money simultaneously with the common
value auctions, thereby guaranteeing a steady cash inflow against
which to charge any losses incurred in the common value auctions. A
second treatment involved sellers’ markets in which bidders tendered
offers to sell an item of unknown value. Each bidder was given one
item with the option to keep it and collect its value or to sell it. Lind
and Plott’s results largely confirm those reported by Kagel and Levin
and their associates. 
Cox, Dinkin, and Smith (1998) conducted auctions using Kagel
and Levin’s design in which, under one treatment, they reinitialize bid-
ders’ cash balances in each auction period, with balances large enough
that subjects could not go bankrupt even if biding well above their sig-
nal values. In contrast to this unlimited-liability treatment, their other
treatments employed procedures where cash balances fluctuated, bid-
ders could go bankrupt, and in some treatments, bidders with negative
cash balances were permitted to continue to bid. Using data for all
treatments and all levels of bidder experience, Cox, Dinkin, and Smith
find no significant differences in individual bid patterns in the unlim-
ited-liability treatment, contrary to Hansen and Lott’s argument. Fur-
ther, restricting their analysis to experiments with experienced
subjects, and dropping data from an entire experiment if even one sub-
ject adopted a pattern of high bids when having a negative cash bal-
ance, Cox, Dinkin, and Smith find that the unlimited-liability treatment
significantly increased individual bids, the exact opposite of Hansen
and Lott’s hypothesis. This unexpected outcome is, however, consis-
tent with Kagel and Levin’s (1991) argument that in a multi-auction
setting, where cash balances carry over from one auction to the next,
there is a potentially powerful offset to any limited-liability forces
present in a one-shot auction: Overly aggressive bidding due to low
cash balances may be offset by the risk that such bids will result in
bankruptcy, thereby preventing participation in later auctions with their
positive expected profit opportunities. Unfortunately, it is also consis-
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tent with the artifactual explanation that because subjects were paid off
in only a few of the unlimited-liability auctions (in order to keeps costs
to a manageable level), subjects treated these auctions differently than
those in which they were paid as a result of each outcome.9
Summary
Even after allowing for some learning as a result of feedback
regarding past auction outcomes, a strong winner’s curse is reported
for inexperienced bidders in sealed-bid common value auctions. High
bidders earn negative average profits and consistently bid above the
expected value of the item conditional on having the high signal value.
Further, this is not the result of a handful of overly aggressive bidders
but applies rather broadly across the sample population. Similar results
are reported in low-bid wins, supply auctions with both student sub-
jects and professional bidders drawn from the commercial construction
industry (Dyer, Kagel, and Levin 1989). Arguments that these results
can be accounted for on the basis of limited liability for losses have
been shown to be incorrect. Further, a clever experiment by Holt and
Sherman (1994) (also see Avery and Kagel 1997) is able to rule out the
idea that the winner’s curse is a result of an added thrill, or extra utility,
from winning. 
Note that the overbidding associated with the winner’s curse is not
simply a matter of miscalibrated bidders, it is associated with funda-
mental breakdowns of the comparative static predictions of the rational
bidding model: With a winner’s curse public information reduces reve-
nue, contrary to the theory’s prediction, as the additional information
helps high bidders to correct for overly optimistic estimates of the
item’s worth. In second-price sealed-bid auctions, increased numbers
of bidders produce no change in bidding, contrary to the robust Nash
equilibrium prediction that bids will decrease (Kagel, Levin, and
Harstad 1995). 
We are still left with the puzzle, first expressed by Lind and Plott,
that although many experiments report a clear winner’s curse (negative
profits), comparing between the symmetric RNNE and totally naive
bidding models offered in the literature (all players treat their signals as
if they are private values and go on to bid as if in a private value auc-
tion; Kagel and Levin 1986), bidding is closer to the RNNE. One
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promising explanation for this phenomenon appears to be that bidders
are cursed to different degrees. That is, agents may make partial, but
incomplete, adjustments for the adverse selection effect associated
with common value auctions, with the perfectly rational and perfectly
naive bidding models being polar cases. Depending on the extent to
which players are “cursed,” they may suffer losses, but bidding can, in
fact, still be closer to the symmetric RNNE bidding model than the
totally naive bidding model. (See Eyster and Rabin 2000 for a formal
model of this sort.)
ENGLISH AUCTIONS AND FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS WITH 
INSIDER INFORMATION 
My colleagues and I have also studied English auctions and first-
price auctions with insider information (one bidder knows the value of
the item with certainty and this is common knowledge). These experi-
ments were initially motivated by efforts to identify institutional struc-
tures that would eliminate, or mitigate, the winner’s curse for
inexperienced bidders. The experiments also investigate the compara-
tive static properties of Nash equilibrium bidding models for very
experienced bidders. In both institutional settings, the winner’s curse is
alive and well for inexperienced bidders, although it is clearly less
severe in English than in first-price auctions.
In contrast, comparative static predictions of the Nash equilibrium
bidding model are largely satisfied for more experienced bidders.
However, in the case of English auctions, the information processing
mechanism that the Nash bidding model specifies is not satisfied.
Rather, bidders follow a relatively simple rule of thumb that results in
almost identical prices and allocations as the Nash model’s predictions
for the distribution of signal values employed in the experiment. In the
insider information auctions, less-informed bidders (outsiders) have
some proprietary information (i.e., the insider knows the value of the
item with certainty but does not know the outsiders’ signals). This
results in marked differences in predicted outcomes compared to the
standard insider information model in which the insider has a double
informational advantage—she knows the value of the item and the sig-
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nals the outsiders have (Wilson 1967; Weverbergh 1979; Englebrecht-
Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber 1983; Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson
1994). Most notably, in our model the existence of an insider generates
higher average revenue than in auctions with a symmetric information
structure, a prediction that is satisfied in the data for experienced bid-
ders. In contrast, in the double informational advantage model the
existence of an insider reduces average revenue.
English Auctions
Levin, Kagel, and Richard (1996) implement an irrevocable exit,
ascending-price (English) auction. Prices start at x, the lowest possible
value for xo, and increase continuously. Bidders are counted as actively
bidding until they drop out of the auction and are not permitted to reen-
ter once they have dropped out. The last bidder earns a profit equal to
xo less the price at which the last bidder dropped out. Bidders observe
the prices at which their rivals drop out of the bidding. Auctions of this
sort have been run in Japan (Milgrom and Weber 1982; Cassady 1967).
The irrevocable exit procedure, in conjunction with the public posting
of drop-out prices, insures that in equilibrium bidders can infer their
rivals’ signal values from their drop-out prices. 
In a symmetric RNNE, the bidder with the low signal value (xL)
drops out of the auction once the price reaches his signal value.10 The
price at which the low bidder drops out of the auction reveals his signal
value to the remaining bidders. Thus, the public information, xL, that
was provided by the experimenters in Kagel and Levin (1986) is pro-
vided endogenously here (at least in theory) by the first drop-out price.
Given the uniform distribution of signal values around xo, in a symmet-
ric equilibrium, for any remaining bidder j, (xL + xj)/2 provides a suffi-
cient statistic for xo conditional on xj being the highest signal, so that
drop-out prices other than xL contain no additional information and
should be ignored. This sufficient statistic is the equilibrium drop-out
price for j (dj) in the symmetric RNNE
dj = (xL + xj)/2.
This represents the maximum willingness to pay, conditional on all the
information revealed by earlier drop-out prices and conditional on win-
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ning. As in first-price auctions with xL publicly announced, expected
profit in the English auction is sharply reduced (by about a half) com-
pared to first-price auctions with strictly private information (as long as
n > 2). As such, in equilibrium, the English auction is predicted to sig-
nificantly raise average sellers’ revenue compared to first-price sealed-
bid auctions. 
The key difference between the English auction and a first-price
sealed-bid auction with xL publicly announced is that in the English
auction information dissemination is endogenous, rather than exoge-
nous. Higher signal holders must be able to recognize and process the
relevant information, and low signal holders must recognize the futility
of remaining active once the price exceeds their signal value. As such,
we would expect the information dissemination process to be noisier
than with xL publicly announced. Nevertheless, if bidders are able to
correctly recognize and incorporate the public information inherent in
other bidders’ drop-out prices, we would predict two results: 1) for
inexperienced bidders, contrary to the Nash equilibrium bidding
model’s prediction, English auctions will reduce average sellers’ reve-
nues compared to first-price sealed-bid auctions, as losses will be
sharply reduced, or even be eliminated, on average, in the English auc-
tions, and 2) for more experienced bidders, where negative average
profits have been largely eliminated in the sealed-bid auctions, the
English auctions will raise average revenue, as the theory predicts. The
second prediction is the standard, equilibrium prediction. The first pre-
diction follows directly from our experience with first-price auctions
with xL publicly announced.
Table 4.3 shows averages of predicted and actual changes in reve-
nue between English and first-price auctions for inexperienced bidders,
as well as averages of predicted and actual profit, with the results clas-
sified by numbers of bidders and ε.11 Average revenue is predicted to be
higher in the English auctions in all cases, for the set of signal values
actually drawn, with significantly higher average revenue predicted for
all values of ε with n = 4 and for ε = $12 with n = 7.12 However, for
these inexperienced bidders, with the exception of n = 4 and ε = $24,
actual revenue is lower in the English auctions in all cases, with signif-
icantly lower average revenue for n = 4 and 7 with ε = $6, and with the
reduction in revenue barely missing statistical significance (at the 10
percent level) with n = 7 and ε = $12. Further, the revenue increase
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Table 4.3 Inexperienced Bidders: Actual versus Theoretical Revenue Changes and Profit Levelsa in English versus 
First-Price Auctions
n = 4 n = 7
Average change in revenue: 
English less first-price
Average profit Average change in revenue:
English less first-price
Average profit






































$6 –1.54** 1.54*** –3.08*** –2.13 2.76 –0.58 1.23 –1.98** 0.10 –2.08** –3.85 0.99 –l.87 0.89
(0.72) (0.49) (0.71) (0.52) (0.38) (0.50) (0.30) (0.87) (0.34) (0.78) (0.71) (0.19) (0.51) (0.29)
[29] [28] [18] [18]
$12 –0.54 2.76*** –3.30*** –1.32 5.01 –0.78 2.25 –1.95* 1.08 –3.03*** –3.75 2.76 –1.80 1.68
(1.25) (0.92) (0.84) (0.79) (0.60) (0.95) (0.69) (1.19) (0.65) (0.92) (0.89) ( 0.53) (0.77) (0.40)
[41] [45] [30] [43]
$24 1.09 8.10*** –7.01** 1.20 9.83 0.11 1.73 ND ND ND ND ND
(3.29) (2.32) (3.05) (1.93) (1.25) (2.64) (2.14)
[25] [13]
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Bracketed terms are the number of auction periods. ND = no data. *The null hypothesis that
the value is greater than or equal to zero can be rejected at the 10% significance level; **the null hypothesis that the value is greater than
or equal to zero can be rejected at the 5% level; ***the null hypothesis that the value is greater than or equal to zero can be rejected at
the 1% level.
a All values reported in dollars.
SOURCE: From Levin, Kagel, and Richard (1996). Reprinted with permission of the American Economic Association.
86 Kagel
with n = 4 and ε = $24 is statistically insignificant, and is well below
the predicted increase.
These perverse revenue effects in terms of Nash equilibrium bid-
ding theory are associated with negative average profit in both the first-
price and English auctions. The negative average profits reported in
Table 4.3 indicate that inexperienced bidders suffered from a winner’s
curse in both auction institutions, but that the curse was relatively stron-
ger in the first-price auctions. These results serve to generalize those
reported for first-price sealed-bid auctions with xL publicly announced:
Given a relatively strong winner’s curse in sealed-bid auctions, public
information reduces rather than raises sellers’ average revenue. The two
major differences between the present results and the first-price auc-
tions with xL publicly announced are: 1) here, public information is gen-
erated endogenously in the form of drop-out prices, and 2) average
profits in the English auctions were negative, but with the exogenous
release of public information in the first-price auctions they were posi-
tive. This last result suggests that information dissemination in the
English auction is noisier than with xL publicly announced.13
For more experienced bidders, English auctions are capable of
raising average sellers’ revenue, as the data in Table 4.4 demonstrate.
With n = 4, actual revenue is higher in the English auctions for both
values of ε, with a statistically significant increase for ε = $18. How-
ever, for n = 7, there is essentially no difference in revenue between the
first-price and English auctions. The significant increase in revenue in
English auctions with n = 4 and ε = $18 is associated with elimination
of the worst effects of the winner’s curse in the first price auctions, as
bidders earned a substantial share (more than 50 percent) of predicted
profit. The importance of eliminating the winner’s curse for the reve-
nue-raising prediction of the theory to hold is reinforced by the absence
of any revenue increase with n = 7, in conjunction with the relatively
low share of expected profit (21 percent) that was earned in these first-
price auctions.
Levin, Kagel, and Richard (1996) develop an econometric model
to characterize how bidders process information in the English auc-
tions. As noted, the Nash bidding model predicts that bidders with
higher signal values will average their own signal value with the first
drop-out price observed, ignoring all intermediate drop-out prices.
What Levin, Kagel, and Richard found, however, is that bidders placed
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Table 4.4 Super-Experienced Bidders: Actual versus Theoretical Revenue Changes and Profit Levelsa in English 
versus First-Price Auctions
n = 4 n = 7
Average change in revenue: 
English less first-price
Average profit Average change in revenue: 
English less first-price
Average profit)






































$18 2.21** 3.96*** –1.75** 3.37 6.77 1.16 2.82 –0.25 2.85*** –3.10*** 0.76 3.86 1.01 1.01
(0.95) (0.73) (0.68) (0.50) (0.48) (0.88) (0.53) (0.86) (0.61) (0.59) (0.65) (0.50) (0.56) (0.37)
[163] [107] [75] [96]
1.20 2.98 –1.78 8.45 11.27 7.25 8.29
$30 (3.10) (2.30) (2.19) (1.28) (1.34) (2.76) (l.93) ND ND ND
[31] [33]
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Bracketed terms are the number of auction periods. ND = no data. **The null hypothesis that
the value is greater than or equal to zero can be rejected at the 5% significance level; ***the null hypothesis that the value is greater than
or equal to zero can be rejected at the 1% significance level.
a All values reported in dollars.
SOURCE: From Levin, Kagel, and Richard (1996). Reprinted with permission of the American Economic Association.
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weight on their own signal value and the immediate past drop-out
price, ostensibly ignoring xL and any earlier drop-out prices. Further, as
more bidders dropped out, subjects placed less and less weight on their
own signal value, and more weight on the last drop-out price. This pat-
tern, although inconsistent with the Nash model, is consistent with bid-
ders acting as if they were averaging their own signal value with the
signal values underlying the drop-out prices of all earlier bidders.
Levin, Kagel, and Richard attribute the adoption of this signal averag-
ing rule in favor of the Nash rule to the fact that it is easy and quite nat-
ural to use, and that it yields results similar to the Nash rule without
requiring that bidders explicitly recognize the adverse selection effect
of winning the auction and/or knowing anything about sufficient statis-
tics.
Auctions with Insider Information
Kagel and Levin (1999) investigate bidding in first-price sealed-
bid auctions with an asymmetric information structure (AIS). The
asymmetry is introduced by choosing one bidder at random in each
auction period—the insider (I)—to receive a private information signal
x equal to xo and being told that x = xo. Each of the other bidders, the
outsiders (Os), receive a private information signal from a uniform dis-
tribution on [xo – ε, xo + ε], as in the auctions with a symmetric infor-
mation structure (SIS). The insider does not know the realizations of
Os’ private information signals. Os know that they are Os, that there is
a single I who knows xo, and the way that all other Os got their private
signals.
Note that this information structure differs substantially from the
“standard” insider information model employed in the economics liter-
ature in which the insider has a double informational advantage—I
knows xo and Os only have access to public information about xo
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber 1983; Hendricks and Por-
ter 1988). In contrast, in our design Os have some proprietary informa-
tion, which permits them to earn positive expected profit in
equilibrium. In the double informational advantage model, Os earn
zero expected profit in equilibrium. 
This experimental design has a number of interesting comparative
static predictions that contrast sharply with the double informational
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advantage model. First and foremost, the existence of an insider bene-
fits the seller by increasing expected revenue relative to auctions with
an SIS. In contrast, in the double informational advantage model, the
existence of an insider unambiguously reduces sellers’ expected reve-
nue.14 Second, increases in the number of Os results in Is bidding more
aggressively in our model. In contrast, in the double informational
advantage model, I’s bidding strategy is unaffected by increases in the
number of Os. Finally, both models imply that Is earn substantially
larger expected profit than Os (zero profit for Os in the double informa-
tional advantage model), and that Is earn higher expected profit, condi-
tional on winning, than in SIS auctions, although the predicted increase
in profit is relatively small in our design. 
Kagel and Levin (1999) conjecture that for inexperienced bidders
the existence of an insider might attenuate the winner’s curse. Os in the
AIS auctions who win against better informed Is face a stronger
adverse selection effect than in SIS auctions. However, it is entirely
plausible that the need to hedge against the existence of an insider is
more intuitive and transparent than the adverse selection problem
resulting from winning against symmetrically informed rivals. Thus, at
least for inexperienced bidders, having an insider may actually reduce
the severity of the winner’s curse. This would be true, for example, if
Os view the situation as similar to a lemon’s market (Akerlof 1970),
where it seems reasonably clear there is no rampant winner’s curse (our
culture warns us to beware of used car salesmen). On the other hand,
inexperienced subjects may bid higher in order to make up for their
informational disadvantage, thus exacerbating the winner’s curse.
Kagel and Levin employ two alternative definitions of the winner’s
curse for Os in the AIS auctions. The first, very conservative definition
concerns bidding above the expected value conditional on having the
highest signal value among Os (ignoring I’s bid). If all Os bid this way,
and Is best respond to these bids, then Os would earn average losses of
more than $1.50 per auction, conditional on winning. The second defi-
nition accounts for Is best responding to Os’ bids, and solves for the
zero expected profit level for Os. Table 4.5 reports results for inexperi-
enced bidders in these auctions. The data clearly indicate that the win-
ner’s curse is alive and well for inexperienced Os. Consider auctions
with ε = $6, which were used to start each session. With n = 4, almost
60 percent of the high Os’ bids were above the conservative measure of
90Table 4.5 Inexperienced Bidders: Auctions with Asymmetric Information Structure (AIS)





















































































































































NOTE: Sm = standard error of the mean. ** Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level, two-tailed test; *** significantly different from
0 at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
a High bids only.
b A single outlier bid less than xo– ε was dropped.
c In this treatment, high Os actually bid above their signal values, on average.
SOURCE: From Kagel and Levin (1999). Reprinted with permission of the Econometric Society.
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the winner’s curse, so that these bids would have lost money, on aver-
age, just competing against other Os. Further, considering the behavior
of both Is and Os (the second winner’s curse measure), 94 percent of
the high O bids were subject to the winner’s curse. With n = 7, there is
an even stronger adverse selection effect, with the result that the win-
ner’s curse was more pervasive: 100 percent of the high O bids and
85.2 percent of all O bids fell prey to the winner’s curse, even with no
accounting for I’s bids. The net result, in both cases, was large negative
profits for Os when they won (–$1.68 per auction with n = 4; –$3.68
with n = 7). Although somewhat diminished in frequency, a strong
winner’s curse is also reported for higher values of ε as Os continued to
earn negative profits throughout, with at least 47 percent of all bids
subject to the winner’s curse for any value of ε (when accounting for
both Is’ and Os’ bids). Finally, regressions comparing bid functions for
inexperienced Os in AIS auctions versus inexperienced bidders in SIS
auctions show no significant difference between the two treatments.
Thus, contrary to Kagel and Levin’s original conjecture, the introduc-
tion of an insider did not induce significantly less aggressive bidding
for inexperienced Os compared to SIS auctions.
Table 4.6 reports data for super-experienced bidders (subjects who
had participated in at least two prior first-price sealed-bid auction ses-
sions). For these bidders the winner’s curse has been largely eliminated
and the comparative static predictions of the theory are generally satis-
fied. Is earned significantly greater profits conditional on winning than
did Os. For example, with e = $18 and n = 7, Os earned average profits
of around $0.50 per auction conditional on winning. In contrast, Is
earned around $3.25 per auction, conditional on winning. Further, Os
earned substantially lower profits than in corresponding SIS auctions,
for which profits averaged around $2.25 per auction. Also, as the the-
ory predicts, Is increased their bids in the face of greater competition
from more Os. 
Last, but not least, as the theory predicts, for more experienced
bidders, auctions with insider information consistently raised average
sellers’ revenue compared to SIS auctions (Table 4.7). The intuition
underlying this prediction for our model is as follows: The seller would
be unambiguously worse off in the AIS auction relative to the SIS auc-
tion if Is in the AIS auction won all the time while bidding according to
the prescribed (AIS) equilibrium. However, Is do not win all the time,
92Table 4.6 Super-Experienced Bidders: Auctions with Asymmetric Information Structure (AIS)
Number of 
bidders ε
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NOTE: Sm = standard error of the mean. ***Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level, two-tailed t-test.
a High bids only.
b Includes several auctions with n = 6.
c A single outlier bid less than xo– ε was dropped.
SOURCE: From Kagel and Levin (1999). Reprinted with permission of the Econometric Society.
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and when Os win (with their equilibrium bid), they win with relatively
high signal values, yielding more revenue than when Is win. Further,
the existence of the insider helps to “protect” the seller’s revenue com-
pared to an SIS auction when Os would have won with relatively low
signal values in the SIS auction, since in this case I wins and pays more
than O would have paid in the SIS auction. The net result is higher rev-
enue for the seller and reduced variance in seller’s revenue (holding xo
constant) compared to SIS auctions.15
The increase in revenue resulting from an insider in our model is
counterintuitive for those whose intuition has been honed on the dou-
ble informational advantage model. This reversal of the double infor-
mational advantage model’s prediction rests critically on the fact that
less informed bidders have some proprietary information. Many “real
world” cases are more realistically modeled with Os having some pro-
prietary information and not just public information. In these circum-
stances, it may well be the case that the introduction of a single well-
informed insider increases average sellers’ revenue, and that both Is
and Os earn economic rents. This potential for insider information to
raise average sellers’ revenue had not been explicitly recognized in the
auction literature prior to this.16
Table 4.7 Change in Seller’s Revenue: AIS versus SIS Auctions with 
Super-Experienced Bidders
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NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. *Significantly different from 0 at p < 0.10, one-
tailed test; **significantly different from 0 at p < 0.05, one-tailed test.





Summary and Policy Implications
Experimental studies of common value auctions have been going
on for more than 15 years now, paralleling the profession’s interest in
the theoretical and practical properties of these auctions. This research
has established several facts about behavior relative to the theory.
For inexperienced bidders, Nash equilibrium bidding theory does
not predict well. Inexperienced bidders suffer from a winner’s curse,
earning negative average profits and with relatively large numbers of
bidders going bankrupt. Overbidding here represents a fundamental
breakdown in the theory, resulting in the reversal of a number of
important comparative static predictions: Bidding does not decrease in
response to increased numbers of bidders in second-price auctions as
the theory predicts, and public information about the value of the item
reduces, rather than raises, revenue in the presence of a winner’s curse.
This perverse effect of public information in the presence of a winner’s
curse extends to the endogenous release of public information in
English clock auctions. 
Experienced bidders in the lab eventually overcome the worst
effects of the winner’s curse, rarely bidding above the expected value
of the item conditional on winning and earning positive average prof-
its. Super-experienced bidders also satisfy key comparative static pre-
dictions of the theory: Release of public information in sealed-bid
auctions raises revenue, and English clock auctions raise more revenue
than do sealed-bid auctions. Further, average revenue increases in an
experimental design where the existence of an informed insider is pre-
dicted to raise revenue compared to auctions with symmetrically
informed bidders. Nevertheless, these super-experienced bidders still
earn well below equilibrium profits and, in the overwhelming majority
of cases, are not best responding to rivals’ bids (they are bidding far
more aggressively than they should; Kagel and Richard 2001).
It is worth noting that these very experienced bidders in the lab
have learned how to overcome the worst effects of the winner’s curse
in an environment with strong information feedback, substantially
stronger than is likely to be present in field settings. As such, learning
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might not proceed as quickly in field settings. Further, there are
dynamics of interactions within organizations that may retard adjust-
ment to the winner’s curse. These include payments of large salaries to
petroleum geologists to estimate likely reserves, and then having to
recognize that these estimates still have a very large variance and are
not very precise; transfers of personnel within the firm and between
firms prior to receiving feedback about the profitability of bids; and
gaming that goes on within organizations.17 Finally, even assuming that
the winner’s curse will be eliminated in the long run in field settings, it
often takes some time before this happens, so this out-of-equilibrium
behavior is important in its own right.
The winner’s curse extends to a number of other settings as well:
bilateral bargaining games (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985; Ball, Baz-
erman, and Carroll 1991), blind-bid auctions (Forsythe, Isaac, and Pal-
frey 1989), markets where quality is endogenously determined (Lynch
et al. 1986, 1991), and voting behavior (the swing voters curse; Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer 1998, 1999).18
Experimental studies of auction markets have played a significant
role in the design and execution of the recent wave of spectrum (air
wave rights) auctions carried out in this country and abroad.19 Auction
experiments have served two principle functions in this work: 1) as a
“wind tunnel” to test out the auction software, which implements a rel-
atively complicated set of bidding rules (see, for example, Plott 1997),
and 2) as a test bed against which to compare theory with behavior. In
the latter role, a central design element has been to use ascending-price
auctions (with price feedback for bidders) to both minimize the pres-
ence of the winner’s curse and to generate increased revenue in the
absence of a winner’s curse, central insights derived from the interac-
tion between common value auction theory and experiments: 
An ascending auction ought to remove another common problem
with auctions, the “winner’s curse.” This strikes when a success-
ful bidder discovers too late that his prize is not worth what he
paid for it. Some critics of the scale of the bids seem to see the
curse at work [in Britain’s third generation sales]. Yet the winner’s
curse is much likelier in sealed-bid auctions, where bidders lack
an important piece of information about the value of the asset: the
valuations of other, perhaps better-informed, bidders. In an
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ascending auction, however, that information is clearly revealed.
(The Economist 2000, p. 21)
. . . by allowing bidders to respond to each other bids, [an ascend-
ing-price auction] diminishes the winner’s curse: that is, the ten-
dency for naive bidders to bid up the price beyond the licenses’s
actual value, or for shrewd bidders to bid cautiously to avoid over
paying. (McAfee and McMillan 1996, p. 161)
Notes
Research support from the Economics and DRMS Divisions of NSF, the Sloan Foun-
dation, and the Russell Sage Foundation are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks
to my colleagues and my coauthors, especially Dan Levin, who have taught me so
much. Much of the material here is taken from my paper with Dan Levin titled “Bid-
ding in Common Value Actions: A Survey of Experimental Research,” which appears
as Chapter 1 in the collection of our published papers investigating common value auc-
tions: John H. Kagel and Dan Levin, Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse,
Princeton University Press.
1. Here, I am assuming that buyers are competing to purchase an item. Similar
remarks hold for procurement auctions in which sellers compete to offer services
at the lowest cost. In this case, however, the trade-off is inverted; the higher their
bids, the larger the surplus conditional on winning, but the lower the probability
of winning.
2. However, once the seller uses a minimum bid requirement, and/or we consider
entry to be determined endogenously, different auctions may induce different
probabilities of an actual sale. Thus, efficiency may become an issue (Levin and
Smith 1994).
3. Unless, of course, one argues that the Groucho Marx statement “I do not wish to
join any club that accepts me,” is an earlier recognition of the winner’s curse.
4. See, for example, the exchange between Cox and Isaac (1984, 1986) and Brown
(1986).
5. Winning bidders paid these losses out of their own pockets or from earnings in
other auctions.
6. There is a whole body of psychological literature indicating the difficulty of learn-
ing generalizing across different contexts (see, for example, Gick and Holyoak
1980; Perkins and Salomon 1988; Salomon and Perkins 1989).
7. Kagel and Levin (1986) did not restrict low signal holders to bidding xL, failing to
recognize that without this restriction there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
but a much more complicated mixed strategy equilibrium so that their benchmark
calculations are incorrect. However, the correct benchmark yields an even higher
increase in revenue from announcing xL so that the conclusions reached regarding
Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse 97
public information receive even stronger support with the correct benchmark
(Campbell, Kagel, and Levin 1999).
8. The greater the number of rivals, the lower the probability of winning as a result
of more aggressive bidding; hence, the less likely it is to pay to deviate from the
Nash strategy even with limited liability. See also the calculations reported in
Kagel and Richard (2001).
9. For a completely different approach to the limited liability problem, see Avery
and Kagel (1997).
10. The intuition is roughly as follows: Given symmetry, the low signal holder knows
that those remaining in the auction have higher signal values. But the low signal
holder can’t profit from this additional information since it is only revealed once
the price is greater than these remaining signal values; i.e., price is already greater
than the expected value of the item to the low signal holder. The analysis is con-
fined in the interval
11. Common value auctions involve pure surplus transfers so that revenue differences
are calculated as: [πE – πF] where πE and πF correspond to profits in English and
first-price auctions, respectively. In this way we have effectively normalized for
sampling variability in xo by subtracting it from the price.
12. t-tests are conducted for predicted revenue increases to measure the reliability of
the prediction for Levin, Kagel, and Richard sample data. One-tailed t-tests are
used here since the symmetric RNNE makes unambiguous predictions regarding
revenue increases. Two-tailed t-tests are used for determining statistical signifi-
cance of actual revenue changes, since in practice there are force promoting lower
revenues in English auctions and we often observe this outcome.
13. To further investigate this question, we have conducted some additional sessions
with inexperienced bidders in which xL was publicly announced prior to bidding
in the English auction. In auctions with six bidders and ε = $12, average profits in
the standard English auction (where xL was not announced) were –$1.55, with
average profits in auctions with xL announced of $1.56 (t = 1.46, d.f. = 30, p <
0.10, one-tailed test; Kagel and Levin 2002).
14. Although one can readily demonstrate that increased revenue is not a general
characteristic of AIS auctions in which Os have some proprietary information, it
is a natural element in our design and can be found in other AIS structures as well
(Campbell and Levin 2000).
15. In our design, the increase in revenue going from SIS to AIS varies with n, with
revenue differences increasing starting from low n, reaching a maximum revenue
differential for intermediate levels of n, and decreasing thereafter.
16. These results motivated Campbell and Levin (2000) to further investigate the role
of insider information in first-price auctions compared to homogeneous informa-
tion environments. This chapter connects the revenue raising effects of an insider
to more general propositions regarding the revenue raising effects of increased
bidder information found in Milgrom and Weber (1982).
17. A friend of mine in Houston who was a geologist for a major oil company told me
that there was such a broad range of legitimate value estimates for most tracts that
ε ε.x x x+ ≤ ≤ −
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when the bidding department started reducing bids relative to value estimates to
the point that they were winning very few auctions, the geologists simply raised
their estimates. (Geologists love to drill, and failure to win tracts means they can’t
drill.)
18. See Kagel and Levin (2002) for reviews of this work, or better yet, consult the
original publications.
19. Led by the Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. government has con-
ducted a number of sales to date raising a total of $23.9 billion and selling over
10,000 licenses between July 1994 and July 2000. Even more spectacular, in an
auction ending in April 2000, the British government raised £22.5 billion ($35.53
billion) from the sale of “third generation” mobile phone licenses. See Klemperer
(2000) and McAfee and McMillan (1996) for reviews and evaluations of these
auctions.
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